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Firemen's Recovery From Negligent Landowners
Kenneth D. Stern*
HE RIGHT OF A FIREMAN or policeman to recover from a negligent
landowner for injuries suffered while the fireman or policeman is
on the landowner's property in an official capacity is a question which
has produced a variety of answers by the various courts. While surveys
of the law in this area are available,' it appears that a study of the
rationale underlying the various arguments dealing with the matter is
called for. Because of the basic similarity in the circumstances which
justify the entrance of both policemen and firemen onto private property
(namely, a danger to the public and to private persons and property),
and because of the duty incumbent on both to answer that call, the gen-
eral law surrounding the rights of both is similar, and in many respects
identical.2 If any valid differentiation can be made, it would appear to
lie in the fact that injuries to firemen often relate to the existence of the
fire itself, which is the primary reason for the fireman's entrance onto the
property in the first place. For that reason, this article concerns itself
with the principal cases dealing with suits for injuries or death to fire-
men, and considers "policemen cases" only where they appear to be per-
tinent to the development of trends in the general field.
The "Licensee" Question
It has been common for courts to classify the fireman as a licensee
while he is in the course of fighting a fire.3 Courts have held that the
"permission" necessary for the fastening of licensee status is either given4
or implied5 by law. Perhaps the most cogent judicial argument in favor
* B.A., Ohio University, Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall School of Law
of Baldwin-Wallace College; Legal Aide to Attorney General of Ohio (1960-62); Law
clerk to law firm of Hribar & Conway, of Euclid, Ohio (1963-66); Currently Legal
Reporter for Daily Legal News, Cleveland, Ohio.
1 See especially Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 1205, and 6 De Paul L. Rev. 97 (1956-7).
2 See Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38
(1963), which involved a policeman as plaintiff, who sought to distinguish himself
from firemen in order to avoid classification as a licensee. The court refused to draw
any such distinction.
3 Beehler v. Daniels, Cornell & Co., 19 R.I. 49, 31 A. 582 (1895); Eckes v. Stetler, 98
App.Div. 76, 90 N.Y.S. 473 (1904); Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo.
316, 110 P. 203 (1910); Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 158 Cal. 579,
112 P. 459 (1910); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. O'Leary, 136 S.W. 601 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1911); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Johansen, 107 Tex. 336, 179
S.W. 853 (1915), aff'g 143 S.W. 1186; Todd & Armour & Co., 44 Ga. App. 609, 162
S.E. 394 (1932); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dixon, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 203 (Ohio App.
1932); Mulcrone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478, 4 N.W.2d 97 (1942); Ryan v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry. Co., 315 Ill. App. 65, 42 N.E.2d 128, 133 (1942); Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237
Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965).
4 Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N.E.2d 1113, 1116 (1893).
5 Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d 1008, 1009 (1936). The
(Continued on next page)
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of classifying firemen as licensees appears in BaxIey v. Williams Con-
struction Co.":
The plaintiff occupied the status of a licensee (citing Todd v. Armour
& Co.).7 We are requested to overrule this (Todd) case as being out-
moded and the enunciation of an inhumane rule. We think the Todd
decision is right. The rule is not based on the idea that a fireman is
an inferior person who is not entitled to the same protection as other
citizens invited upon premises by owners or others having control
thereof. The rule is based on sound public policy. In the first place
the right of a fireman to go upon premises to extinguish a fire is
based on the permission of the law and not an invitation of the own-
er or occupier even if the owner or occupier turns in the alarm.
Such a permission is one which the occupier or owner may not deny.
The basic reason for the rule is that it is impossible to forecast the
precise place where or time when the fireman's duties may call him,
and to require an owner or occupier of premises to exercise at all
times the high degree of care owed to an invitee in order to guard
against so remote and unpredictable an injury would be an intoler-
able burden which it is not in the best interest of society to im-
pose. (citing Anderson v. Cinnamon8 and Mulcrone v. Wagner.')
It has been said that if a fireman, because of his status as a licensee,
could not recover from the landowner on whose premises he has been
injured, then he ought not to be able to recover if the fire was caused by
the negligence of someone other than the landowner, since "exempting
(the landowner) from liability, but holding liable all others whose negli-
gence starts the fire, is out of accord with the normal principle that the
status of the injured party should not be controlled by the status of the
wrongdoer."' 0 Yet, another jurisdiction has held that the fireman's licen-
see status is available for use as a defense only to those "in ownership
or control of the place" where the fireman's injury occurred, and is not
available to a party whose negligence caused the injury while the fire-
man was fighting a blaze on another's property.'
(Continued from preceding page)
court expressly refused to follow the reasoning in Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery,
infra n. 13, although requested to do so. (The Meiers case involved the use by a fire
chief of a public passageway whereon was an open pit into which he fell in the dark;
in this [Aldworth] case, the plaintiff fireman used a fire escape on the defendant's
property as a platform from which to direct water onto adjacent property.)
6 98 Ga. App. 662, 106 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1958). The court pointed out, however, that
the premises involved were not open to the public. Had the injury occurred on a
public passageway or other area which the fireman could reasonably have expected
to have been kept in a good state of repair, and which the fireman was putting to its
normal use, the result might have been different. See the discussion of "The 'Public
Area' Rule," infra.
7 Supra, n. 3.
8 365 Mo. 304, 282 S.W.2d 445 (1955).
9 Supra, n. 3.
10 Smith v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 83 N.H. 439, 144 A. 57, 61 (1928).
11 Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickens, 156 S.W.2d 1010 (1941), aff'd 140 Tex. 433, 168
S.W.2d 208, 211 (1943), where the Texas Supreme Court said, "The exemption of the
(Continued on next page)
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And where the fireman's injury or death is caused by personal prop-
erty on the landowner's premises, as where a gasoline truck on the prem-
ises explodes, the landowner's liability to a licensee fireman is the same,
"because the rule with respect to the duty toward a licensee is not con-
fined to real property but applies to personal property as well." 12
The requirement of the landowner's consent or invitation as a pre-
requisite to the classification of one as a licensee has given rise to serious
questioning of the wisdom of attempting to use this classification when
dealing with the fireman entering premises in the line of duty. In Meiers
v. Fred Koch Brewery, an often cited 1920 New York case involving in-
juries sustained by a fire chief who, acting in response to a fire alarm,
fell into an unguarded coal pit situated at the end of a driveway used by
the public, it was said:
Here, assume there was no invitation, yet the plaintiff rightfully en-
ters the premises. His right is not based on consent. No consent is
necessary. No refusal of consent would avail. There is no implica-
tion as to what was intended by permission, for none was given. Cer-
tainly, not by the owner, unless by a strained construction of the
facts he is held to have given it because the law requires him to give
it. But, even if so, consent is but one side of the shield. Acceptance
is the other. The plaintiff never voluntarily accepted permission to
enter with the consequences that follow. As to him there was no
consent. There was a command. Under such circumstances it is a
misuse of terms to call him a bare licensee.13 (Emphasis added.)
It was virtually inevitable that firemen and policemen would eventually
be removed from the strict "licensee" classification. Yet courts were, and
still are, reluctant to go so far as to call them "invitees." The only logical
alternative was to say that "firemen, policemen and similar personnel
have a status sui generis . . . Any rule that flatly categorizes firemen
with trespassers disregards the fact that firemen, unlike trespassers, en-
ter rightfully. Any rule that flatly categorizes firemen with invitees or
licensees disregards the fact that firemen, unlike either of the latter, may
enter premises without invitation or license of the owner... Since fire-
men have the unique status just described, it follows that the duties owed
(Continued from preceding page)
landowner from liability as to trespassers and licensees is necessary to secure him
the beneficial use of his land, but no reason exists for extending this exemption to
the case where the rights of the defendant have not been interfered with." The
court cites Osborne v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 158 Tenn. 278, 12 S.W.2d 947
(1929); Smith v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., supra, n. 10; and City of Shreveport
v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 145 La. 680, 82 S.W. 785 (1919). See also Barnett
v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 87 NJ.L. 29, 93 A. 108 (1915).
12 Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Association, 154 Neb. 805, 49 N.W.2d 707 (1951).
13 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491, 492 (1920). For citation of opinion of Sup.Ct., App.Div.,
see infra, n. 26. And, in this general vein, it should be noted that the courts will not
allow the turning in of a fire alarm to be considered an invitation to firemen. Lunt
v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., supra, n. 3; Smith v. Twin State Gas & Electric
Co., supra, n. 10; Baxley v. Williams Construction Co., supra, n. 6; Roberts v. Rosen-
blatt, 146 Conn. 110, 148 A.2d 142 (1959).
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to them may properly be unique." 14 The sui generis rule is being ac-
cepted today 15 and is leading to a more explicit delineation of the duties
owed by the landowner to a policeman or fireman.' 6
When a fire company responds to a call outside the city limits, where
it has no duty to respond and no right to enter the owner's premises
without an invitation, the firemen are invitees, even where they are or-
dinarily considered licensees.17 The same is true when a fire chief, an-
swering a call outside his own jurisdiction, "presses" into service a man
not a fireman, even if the fire chief himself would have been a licensee.' s
Courts hesitate, generally for the reasons stated in the Baxley case, 19
to classify a fireman as an invitee. A 1953 Pennsylvania Common Pleas
decision,20 however, said that a fireman, crushed under a falling elevator
counterweight, had been an "implied invitee" at the time.21 The land-
mark Illinois case of Dini v. Naiditch22 also extended to firemen the
rights of an invitee.23
Aside from the questions of consent, invitation and right to enter,
the matter of benefit is often used to determine the legal status of one
on another's land. It has been said that even though a fireman enters for
the benefit of the owner or occupant of a building, he is performing what
is basically a public function which outweighs any private benefit to the
occupant, and that a fireman is, therefore, a licensee. 24 In holding a fire-
man to be a licensee, the Colorado Supreme Court said that firemen en-
14 Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549, 550-1
(1951).
15 Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., 4 App.Div.2d 276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276
(1957), aff'd without opinion 5 App.Div.2d 980, 173 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1958); Krauth v.
Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129, 130 (1960), which held that, since a fireman's status
is sui generis, "justice is not aided by appending an inappropriate label and then
visiting consequences which flow from a status artificially imputed;" Buren v. Mid-
west Industries, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Ky. App. 1964); Miller v. Roman Catholic
Church of St. Stephen, 24 App.Div.2d 603, 262 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1965).
16 The Beedenbender and Miller cases (supra, n. 15) both limit the landowner's
duties to a fireman under the sui generis rule to: a) keeping publicly-used premises
(used as means of access) in a reasonably safe condition, and b) warning the fire-
man of an unusual and dangerous condition of which the landowner is or should be
aware. And this same 2-duty rule was applied in Aravanis v. Eisenberg, supra, n. 3,
which says that a fireman is a licensee excelit where these duties are violated. The
"Public Area" and "'Unusual Hazard" rules are discussed later in this article.
17 Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646 (1922).
18 Clinkscales v. Mundkoski, 183 Okl. 12, 79 P.2d 562 (1938). The court here actually
ignored the question of the status of a fireman who voluntarily answers a call out-
side his jurisdiction.
19 Supra, n. 6. See excerpt from opinion in text.
20 Mistelske v. Kravco, Inc., 88 Pa. D. & C. 49.
21 However, it had been determined as a matter of fact that the floor supporting the
counterweight would have given way even in the absence of the fire, and the ques-
tion of a fireman's recovery for injuries from hazards resulting from the fire itself
was therefore not considered.
22 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
23 The case is discussed in the brief section on the Illinois rule, infra.
24 Supra, n. 3.
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ter premises, "not in discharge of any private duty due from them to the
occupant, but of a public duty which they owe to the public." And the
court pointed out that "in populous cities," firemen are more concerned
about preventing the spread of a blaze from the burning property than
they are with preserving the property itself, although its preservation
"also concerns them." 25
Yet courts in recent years have been increasingly disposed toward
considering the benefits which accrue to the landowner whose burning
property is entered by firemen. In Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, the
lower court spoke of the fireman as discharging "a public duty on
the premises beneficial to the owner." 26 The affirming opinion of the
New York Court of Appeals acknowledged the interests of the landowner
as an individual, "quite apart from his interests as one of the public." 27
The following year, an Ohio Court of Appeals asserted the existence of
the landowner's private benefit in such cases, and went so far as to say
that in cases "where there are no adjoining properties near enough to be
in danger by the fire, the benefit resulting from (the fireman's) labor
accrues wholly to the owner." 28 At the very least, courts tend to ac-
knowledge the landowner's personal benefit, even if only to refer to it as
"an incident of the protection which the public gives," 29 or as "inciden-
tal" to firemen "performing a duty owed to the public." so The more pro-
gressive view is that "firemen obviously confer on landowners economic
and other benefits which are a recognized basis for imposing the common-
law duty of reasonable care." 31
Safety Statutes
As a general rule, breach of a statutory duty will constitute conclu-
sive evidence of negligence where the plaintiff is a member of the class
sought to be protected,32 but "the cases are not uniform as to whether
a fireman is protected by a statute or ordinance requiring safety guards
or precautions." 33 (In any event, an act which is wrongful merely be-
25 Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., supra, n. 3.
26 180 App.Div. 450, 167 N.Y.S. 740, 743 (1917), aff'd, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
27 Supra, n. 13, 127 N.E. at 492.
28 Mason Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger, 15 Ohio App. 310, 316, 20 Ohio L.R. 577
(1921), aff'd on app, on procedural grounds, 108 Ohio St. 377, 140 N.E. 770 (1923).
29 Smith v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., supra, n. 10. Parker v. Barnard (involv-
ing policeman but discussing firemen), 135 Mass. 116, 46 Am. Rep. 450 (1883).
30 Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., supra, n. 14.
31 Dini v. Naiditch, supra, n. 22.
32 Daggett v. Keshner, 284 App.Div. 733, 134 N.Y.S.2d 524, 527 (1954).
33 Aravanis v. Eisenberg, supra, n. 3, in which the court pointed out that the question
of negligence resulting from a statutory violation will be given judicial consideration
only if raised by the plaintiff, since, "in Maryland, violations of a statute or ordi-
nance are evidence of negligence, but do not constitute negligence per se."
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cause it violates a statute must be shown to have been "the proximate
[in the sense of reasonably foreseeable] cause of the accident.") 34
Exclusion from Protected Class
Whether a fireman falls within the class sought to be protected usu-
ally is determined by factual circumstances in each case, rather than by
some all-inclusive rule of law. For example, where a fireman sought to
recover for injuries sustained while he was fighting a fire caused by neg-
ligent operation of the defendant's locomotive, and based his action on
a statute fastening liability on railroads for damages to persons or prop-
erty from fires set by its locomotives, the court said that such a statute
"applies only to those so situated that as to them the operation of the
railroad constitutes an extra fire hazard," and "does not apply to firemen
... whose exposure results from an attempt to extinguish the fire." 35 In
a similar case, a fireman who fell when a poorly-maintained fire escape
which he used as a platform from which to fight a fire on adjacent prop-
erty sought to avail himself of a statute requiring the maintenance of
means of escape from fires. The court held that the plaintiff was not en-
titled to the statute's protection since he had not been using the fire
escape for the purpose designated in the statute, and was thus not in the
protected class.36 It has been said that a fireman assumes the risk of
violations of safety statutes, except as to "unusual hazards known to the
property owner or occupant but unknown to him," 37 although this is by
no means a universal rule (see following sections on "Inclusion" and
"Assumption of Risk.") Where a safety statute expressly limits its scope
to a given class of persons, not including firemen acting in the line of
duty, a fireman will be precluded from recovering thereunder.
38
Inclusion Within Protected Class
If an ordinance in a municipal building code is so general in nature
as to indicate that it was intended for the protection of "all persons law-
fully within the designated buildings," it will be construed to protect a
policeman or fireman entering the premises in the line of duty, since such
34 Daggett v. Keshner, supra, n. 32.
35 Clark v. Boston & Maine RR., 78 N.H. 428, 101 A. 795, 796 (1917).
36 Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra, n. 5, 3 NXE.2d at 1010.
37 Buren v. Midwest Industries, Inc., supra, n. 15.
38 Kelly v. Henry Muhs Co., 71 N.J.L. 358, 59 A. 23 (Sup.Ct. 1904). Here, a fireman fell
through an open elevator shaft. A statute requiring elevators in factories to be pro-
tected referred to "the employment, safety (and) health . . . of operatives." (em-
phasis added); Eckes v. Stetler, supra, n. 3, wherein an elevator fell through a hatch-
way left open in violation of ordinance and injured the plaintiff fireman, who sued
under a statute which gave a cause of action either to the board of fire commission-
ers (under a statute) or to the fire commissioner (by charter), but not to individual
firemen. Said the court, "It has long been the settled law that, where a statute con-
fers a right and therein prescribes a particular method of procedure for the enforce-
ment of it, such provision furnishes the exclusive remedy, and must be followed."
(90 N.Y.S. at 476-7).
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a person has entered "in a lawful way for a legitimate purpose . . . and
had a right to assume and act upon the assumption that the defendants
were affording him the protection prescribed by the ordinance." 39 This
rule is well-founded in reason and was, as early as 1883, explicitly stated
by the Massachusetts Supreme Court:
Even if (firemen and policemen) must encounter the danger arising
from neglect of such precautions against obstructions and pitfalls as
those invited or induced to enter have a right to expect, they may
demand, as against the owners or occupants, that they observe the
statute in the construction and management of their building.
As a general rule, where an act is enjoined or forbidden under a
statutory penalty, and the failure to do the act enjoined or the doing
of the act forbidden has contributed to an injury, the party thus in
default is liable therefor to the party injured .... 40
The rule that a statute or ordinance, "general in its terms," which seeks
to regulate the maintenance of realty or other actions of owners or occu-
piers of land, for the safety of persons lawfully on the premises, is now
widely held to include firemen, who have a right to rely on the assump-
tion that all landowners are in compliance. 41 However, in some jurisdic-
tions which continue to hold a fireman to be a licensee, the existence of
statutes general in nature will ordinarily not accrue to the benefit of a
fireman, since, in such jurisdictions
The rule is that in the absence of any statute or ordinance prescrib-
ing a duty on the part of the owner of premises to members of a
public fire department, the owner is not liable for injuries to such a
fireman except those proximately resulting from willful or wanton
negligence or a designed injury.42  (Emphasis added.)
39 Racine v. Morris, 201 N.Y. 240, 94 N.E. 864, 866 (1911), aff'g 136 App.Div. 467, 121
N.Y.S. 146. (emphasis added). See also discussion of this opinion at n. 98, infra.
40 Parker v. Barnard, supra, n. 29, 135 Mass. at 119-20. (A policeman, investigating
the premises because an outer door had been left open at night, fell down an un-
guarded elevator shaft. The court, to explain its rationale in permitting recovery,
said, "Were the case at bar that of a fireman ... [injured in the line of duty] . . . he
would have just ground of complaint that the protection which the statute had made
it the duty of the owners or occupants to provide had not been afforded him."
41 Id; Racine v. Morris, supra, n. 39. Drake v. Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, 85 A. 14 (1912);
Bandosz v. Daigger & Co., 255 Ill. App. 494 (1930) (This was under the now-forsaken
Illinois rule that firemen are licensees); Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268
N.Y. 345, 197 N.E. 306 (1935); Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., 274 N.Y. 106, 8 N.E.2d
296 (1937); Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N.J.Misc. 723, 194 A. 873 (1937); Dini v.
Naiditch, supra, n. 22, which set the new Illinois rule. (See the discussion on Illinois,
infra.)
42 Fentress v. Co-Operative Refinery Association, 149 Neb. 355, 31 N.W.2d 225, 227
(1948); approved and followed in Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Assn., supra, n. 12,
which cited New Omaha-Thompson-Houston Electric Light Co. v. Anderson, 73 Neb.
84, 102 N.W. 89 (1905); Eckert, Admr. v. Refiners' Oil Co., 17 Ohio App. 221 (1923).
The old common-law rule in this regard is set forth in Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk
Manufacturing Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899).
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Assumption of Risk, Unusual and Hidden Hazards and the Duty to Warn
All of the foregoing is nothing more than a review of attempts by
the courts to use settled rules of law to deal with the fireman's right of
recovery, involving repeated references to licensee or sui generis status,
discussions of "consent" and "invitation," and the raising of the issue of
whether firemen are within a class intended for protection by legislative
enactments. But the courts go beyond these limiting frameworks and
consider not only the question of a fireman's relation to a landlord, but
also the status of the two as individuals, just as though there were noth-
ing unique in a fireman's relation to the landowner or occupier. In order
to do so, they must first justify their circumvention of the normally lim-
iting status of the fireman.
It clearly cannot be said as a matter of law that the decedent as a fire
patrolman assumed the risk of being killed in a gas explosion which
resulted from the fire he officially attended. Such a risk was not or-
dinarily incident to the discharge of his duties nor did he have any
actual or constructive knowledge of it with full appreciation of the
special dangers confronting him.
It is one thing to say that a fireman who has gone into a danger zone
must take what he gets, and quite another to say that a person who
stops short of the danger zone cannot recover because he is a fire-
man.
43
Thus, the courts relieve from liability the land occupier on whose prop-
erty a fireman is injured, "where the injuries arise from a usual hazard
which is the only reason for his being on the premises and which it is the
very nature of his calling to encounter, absent some special factor," 44
but where the "special factor" exists, the fireman can recover.
43 Ruhl v. City of Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 214, 29 A.2d 784, 787 (1943). (Emphasis add-
ed). And 16 years later, a Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court applied that distinc-
tion to deny recovery for personal injuries resulting in total disability to a fire chief
who inhaled gas leaking from an abandoned refrigerator, while he was attempting to
seal off the leak. The court reasoned:
If this were a hidden danger arising from some special or unforeseen negligence
of defendants and not ordinarily incident to his duties, plaintiff's position would
be tenable, but the complaint here specifically sets forth that plaintiff was in-
formed and fully aware of the fact that gas was escaping from some source in
defendants' building and concedes that before entering the premises he attempted
to protect himself from the known present danger by placing a wet cloth over
his face. We must find, then, under the authorities, that plaintiff assumed the
risk of the danger. (emphasis added.)
Bennett v. Kurland, 21 Pa. D.&C.2d 587, 590 (1959).
44 Krauth v. Geller, supra, n. 15. The court held that assumption of risk exists unless
the landowner is culpable of "negligence with respect to conditions creating undue
risks of injury beyond those inevitably involved in firefighting . . . (W)here liability
is found the emphasis is not upon culpability with respect to the inception of the fire
but rather with respect to other risks ... ." (emphasis added). This is the "undue
risk" rule followed in Jackson v. Velveray Corp., 82 N.J.Super. 469, 198 A.2d 115, 118
(1964), where the court said:
It is important to understand what is meant by "undue risks of injury beyond
(Continued on next page)
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When the land occupier's negligence merely starts the fire and cre-
ates no "unusual hazards known to the property owner or occupant but
unknown to (the fireman)," recovery is generally denied since "the
trained fire fighter is equally cognizant of and better able to evaluate the
unpredictable dangers involved" in the fire itself.45 The Nebraska Su-
preme Court has said that a fireman, to show that his injuries were
caused by something other than dangers incidental to the fire itself, must
prove "that his injuries were designed or proximately caused by willful
or wanton negligence of such owner or occupant or by some hidden dan-
ger or peril upon the premises, known by the occupant or owner but un-
known by the fireman .... and not, if reasonable opportunity is given,
disclosed to such persons or their superiors, who were unable to observe
the same by exercising ordinary care. Therefore, it is immaterial wheth-
er or not the fire was started by negligence .... ,, 46 The rule, which re-
(Continued from preceding page)
those inevitably involved in fire fighting" (citing the Krauth case). We take the
phrase "inevitably involved" to mean "inherent." There are certain risks inherent
in fire fighting: smoke, flame, and the like. The collapse of a floor, ceiling or wall
of a burning building, without more, is a hazard a fireman must ordinarily an-
ticipate. Undue risk beyond these inherent hazards is something more. It in-
cludes hidden perils, such as an open elevator shaft, storage of dangerous sub-
stances, and other conditions independent of the fire itself. (emphasis added).
An earlier (1937) New Jersey case, Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., supra, n. 41, 194 A. at
875, cited in Jackson v. Velveray, had said:
It cannot be said that a fireman has no protective rights whatever while en-
gaged in the pursuit of his employment. It is contemplated that a fireman in the
performance of his duty shall endeavor to extinguish fires however caused and
encounter those risks and hazards which are ordinarily incidental to such an
undertaking and which may reasonably be expected to exist in the situation in
which he places himself. It does not follow that a fireman must be deemed as
a matter of law to have voluntarily assumed all hidden, unknown, and extra-
hazardous dangers which in the existing conditions would not be reasonably an-
ticipated or foreseen. (emphasis added).
And for a well-reasoned argument in this regard, see Smith v. Twin State Gas &
Electric Co., supra, n. 10, 144 A. at 62.
45 Buren v. Midwest Industries, Inc., supra, n. 15, citing Suttie v. Sun Oil Co., 15 Pa.
D. & C. 3 (1931), which held, "The dangers incident to a fire and the risks involved
in the effort to extinguish it are assumed by a fireman when he enters in the per-
formance of his duty," since the fire itself is a "known and obvious danger," but
that a defect which "existed independently of the fire and was neither created by
nor an incident of it," constituted a "danger unknown and therefore unassumed."
But the court was speaking of those risks which are necessarily incident to the act
of fighting the fire. In its decision, the court, in discussing injuries to a fireman
arising out of the landowner's negligence apart from the starting of the fire, referred
to the earlier case of Drake v. Fenton, supra, n. 41, to illustrate the distinction. And
it has been said, with regard to negligence which merely causes the fire without ex-
panding the danger beyond that normally to be expected, that a fireman
knowing that fires will occur from various causes, some culpable and some not,
undertakes the work of extinguishing all fires without reference to how they
were caused. The chance of injury in doing such work is necessarily assumed
by him. This assumption arises from the nature and terms of the contract he
made. He agreed to fight all such fires as should occur . . . (His contract) . . .
establishes an express assumption of the risk here involved, and bars any recov-
ery therefor.
Clark v. Boston & Maine RR., supra, n. 35, 101 A. at 797.
46 Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Assoc., supra, n. 12. (emphasis added).
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moves the restrictions which a doctrinaire "licensee" classification im-
poses, is said to apply only where the property owner (or occupier) has
failed to warn of hidden dangers, or is guilty of statutory violation(s) .47
As Maryland's highest court said in 1965:
It is when the fireman sustains injuries after the initial period of
his anticipated risk, or from perils not reasonably foreseeable as
part of that risk, that the justice of continuing to regard him as a
licensee only is questioned.
48
Another factor may soon be widely dealt with in this regard. In
Jackson v. Velveray Corp., the court held, in denying recovery to a fire-
man, that an owner or occupant of land may be protected by a rule of
non-liability in some instances not only for creating a fire, but also for
negligence in causing its spread, "such as ordinary negligence in house-
keeping which tends to promote the spread of a fire after its inception
from other causes. Indeed, the two situations are often indistinguishable.
Correspondingly, the exception to the foregoing rule, namely, an owner's
or occupier's liability for creating undue risks of injury beyond those in-
evitably involved in firefighting, applies not only to the start of the fire
but also to its spread, e.g. cases involving the storing of a dangerous sub-
stance." 49
Extension of the "Unusual Hazard" Rule
Whether something constitutes an unusual hazard may depend on
the circumstances. It almost goes without saying that there are times
when the type of realty, or the use to which it is being put, is ample evi-
dence of what otherwise would be considered an unusual hazard. Thus,
gasoline stored at a garage does not constitute an unusual hazard of
which a fireman ought to be warned, since the storage of gasoline at a
garage is a matter of common knowledge.50 Yet, there may be other fac-
tors which supersede this ordinarily reasonable rule. In a 1964 Missouri
wrongful death action, the court dealt with a situation wherein the plain-
tiff's decedent, a fireman, had died while fighting a blaze at the defend-
ant's gasoline storage plant and filling station. The fireman had, of
course, been well aware of the existence of the stored gasoline. He was,
however, ignorant of the fact that one of the oil storage tanks was
equipped with an inadequate vent, which constituted a hidden defect,
47 Aravanis v. Eisenberg, supra, n. 3, citing Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible
Church, supra, n. 2; Krauth v. Geller, supra, n. 15, Baxley v. Williams Construction
Co., supra, n. 6, which refused to classify firemen as invitees, and insisted on retain-
ing the licensee characterization; Anderson v. Cinnamon, supra, n. 8.
48 Aravanis v. Eisenberg, supra, n. 3, 206 A.2d at 153-4.
49 Jackson v. Velveray Corp., supra, n. 44 (emphasis added). Yet this is an unusual
analogy, and, in the opinion of this writer, not likely to be widely accepted, since
most factors which hasten the spread of a fire are readily apparent, not hidden.
50 Gannon v. Royal Properties, Inc., 285 App.Div. 131, 136 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1954), aff'd
309 N.Y. 819, 130 N.E.2d 616 (1954).
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increasing the ordinary hazard beyond its normal degree and producing
a hazard that the plaintiff's decedent "was not bound to accept as a usual
hazard of his profession." The court said, "(T)he law does not compel
firemen in fighting a fire to assume all possible lurking hazards and
risks." 51 It has even been held that, where a fireman, exercising "ordi-
nary prudence" for a man of his knowledge and experience, believes that
a hazard 52 has subsided and no longer presents a danger to him, he is not
guilty of contributory negligence in ignoring the danger, and that de-
fense is therefore not available for use by defendants whose own negli-
gence resulted in the hazard and the fireman's injuries or death.53
The fact that a fireman imperils his personal safety in performing his
duties cannot be said to be contributory negligence as a matter of law.
His "conduct must be viewed in the light of the conditions and circum-
stances then existing .... (He is) not treated as assuming obscure and
unknown risks, which are not naturally incident to the occupation and
which, in the existing conditions, would not be reasonably observed and
appreciated." 54 Where the evidence is not clear as to whether a fireman
should have been aware of the danger which caused his injuries, the
issues of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are facts for the
jury.55
51 Bartels v. Continental Oil Co., 384 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1964). Plain-
tiff's decedent, fighting a fire at defendant's storage plant and filling station, was en-
gulfed in a ball of flame when an improperly-vented storage tank exploded. The
court held that a fireman could not be expected to know of such a hidden defc.t.
And see also Lamb v. Sebach, 52 Ohio App. 362, 3 N.E.2d 686 (1935), discussed infra,
in the section on Ohio. The facts were very similar to the Bartels case.
52 In this case, a carload of fireworks in a railroad yard.
53 Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. O'Leary, 136 S.W. 601, 606 (Tex.Civ.App.
1911). The plaintiff's decedent had heard several explosions which had emanated
from the car, but felt that the danger of explosion therefrom had ceased by the time
he approached an adjacent oil car. He had been warned of the danger of explosion
by the defendant's employees, but decided on his own that the danger had subsided.
Notwithstanding the warning, and his classification as a licensee, his estate was
allowed to recover since, the court said, the defendant had been guilty of continuing
negligence: "the negligent act which caused the explosion will be regarded as having
been committed at the time of the occurrence of each explosion." The court used
this reasoning to circumvent the defense of intervening cause. See also Smith v.
Twin State Gas & Electric Co., supra, n. 10. In that case, the defendant gas com-
pany's lines were thought to be leaking, and there was a possibility that the leak
extended onto the premises in question, which were owned by a third party. The
gas company, which knew of the possibility, took no action to investigate. Plaintiff's
decedent, a fire chief, did. In his inspection, seeing that there was apparently very
little gas present, he lit a match, which was determined to be accepted and proper
procedure under the circumstances. Appearances proved misleading, and the result-
ant explosion killed the fire chief. His estate recovered, the court reasoning that he
had had good reason to believe that the gas was present in very small quantity, but
that the gas company, which dealt with the product, should have known better, and
should have warned of the danger.
54 Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., supra, n. 41, 194 A. at 876.
55 Texas Cities Gas Co. v. Dickens, supra, n. 11; Osborne v. Tennessee Electric Pow-
er Co., 158 Tenn. 278, 12 S.W.2d 947, 951 (1929).
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The Duty to Warn
Where a landowner knows of a fire hazard on his premises, the en-
trance onto the premises of a fire official for the purposes of checking into
the matter "might reasonably and naturally be expected under the con-
ditions which existed, and of which the defendant (landowner) had
knowledge." 56 As a result, although the negligent party will not be liable
for injuries resulting from dangers ordinarily incidental to the fire itself,
he will be held answerable in damages where an obvious danger is haz-
ardous beyond the foreseeable degree, provided that he had "superior
knowledge of the (increased) chance of danger," unless he warns the
firemen thereof. A fireman is entitled to warning, by a negligent and
knowledgeable party, of a "special danger," which converts "the danger
of which the risk was assumed into one which in a fair way it may be
said the (fireman) did not bargain for in his contract of service," since
a fireman's employment contract includes "no assumption of an unknown
extrahazardous character" of the dangers present.17 But where a fireman
has the opportunity to apprise himself of the existence, nature and ex-
tent of dangers, as where they are "open and obvious and observed" by
him, there is no duty to warn. That duty exists only as to "defects or
conditions in the nature of hidden dangers." 58
(I)f the owner knows of the presence on the premises of officially
privileged persons, such as firemen or policemen, is cognizant of a
dangerous condition thereon, and has reason to believe that they are
unaware of the danger, he has a duty to warn them of the condition
and of the risk involved.59
If the landowner or occupier reasonably mistakes one danger for an-
other, this alone will not impose liability. For example, where a defend-
ant landowner, a publishing company which used nitric acid in its print-
ing process, mistook escaping acid fumes for smoke and turned in a fire
alarm, it was held that there was no duty to warn responding firemen of
either the existence or dangerous nature of nitric acid fumes.6 0 "The
warning required is such as a person of ordinary care and prudence
would give under like or similar circumstances." 61
If a landowner falsely assures firemen that an open and obvious con-
dition is not dangerous, knowing that it is, as where he tells them that
gasoline storage barrels are empty when in fact he knows they are filled,
56 Smith v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 144 A. 783, 784 (1929) (hearing on Motion
for Rehearing arising out of same case at 83 N.H. 439, 144 A. 57).
57 Id. (original case), at 144 A. 62.
58 Rogers v. Cato Oil & Grease Co., 396 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Okl.Sup.Ct. 1964).
59 Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., supra, n. 15, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 281
(which involved a policeman). For a larger excerpt from this well-reasoned opin-
ion, see the discussion of New York, (infra).
GO Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 P. 203 (1910).
61 Mason Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger, supra, n. 28.
May, 1967
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss2/5
FIREMEN AND NEGLIGENT LANDOWNERS
he is answerable in damages for injury or death to the fireman even if
they are considered licensees. 62
In justification of the imposition of the duty to warn, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota has said:
Certainly, no meritorious reason can be advanced to justify the view
that a property owner, with knowledge of a hidden peril, should be
allowed to stand by in silence when a word of warning might save
firemen from needless peril. The burden of a duty to warn of hidden
perils falls lightly upon the landowner in comparison with the cost
of his silence, which is frequently measured in the lives and limbs
of firemen and in the sorrow and suffering of their families. Al-
though firemen assume the usual risks incident to their entry upon
premises made dangerous by the destructive effect of fire, there is
no valid reason why they should be required to assume the extraor-
dinary disk of hidden perils of which they might easily be warned.
. .. (L)andowners and occupants alike owe a duty to firemen to
warn them of hidden perils where the landowner or occupant has
knowledge of the peril and the opportunity to give warning.63
When there is a duty to warn, it will generally be fulfilled by giving
warning to the first fireman to enter the premises, 64 since to require
actual warning to each firefighter would impose "too great a burden" on
the landowner.65 To be actionable, the failure to fulfill the duty must
have been a "proximate cause of the accident" causing the injury.66 The
most frequent cases involving hidden and unusual hazards arise in those
cases involving the storage or handling of explosive materials or sub-
stances either in a place where their existence, or the degree of the haz-
ard presented, cannot reasonably be anticipated, 67 or in a manner not
commensurate with the degree of care which such storage or handling
requires, 68 or in such place or manner as to violate a safety statute, ordi-
nance or regulation.69 In fact, it has been said that "the explosive mate-
62 Clinkscales v. Mundkoski, supra, n. 18.
63 Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., supra, n. 14, 45 N.W.2d at 553.
64 Schwab v. Rubel Corp., 286 N.Y. 525, 37 N.E.2d 234, 236 (1941).
65 Mason Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger, supra, n. 28.
66 Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., supra, n. 15.
67 Mason Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger, supra, n. 28; Smith v. Twin States Gas &
Electric Co., supra, n. 10; Lamb v. Sebach, 52 Ohio App. 362, 3 N.E.2d 686 (1935);
James v. Cities Service Oil Co., 66 Ohio App. 87, 31 N.E.2d 872 (1939); Ruhl v. City
of Philadelphia, supra, n. 43; Dini v. Naiditch, supra, n. 22; Bartels v. Continental Oil
Co., supra, n. 51.
68 Suttie v. Sun Oil Co., supra, n. 45; Lamb v. Sebach, supra, n. 67; Campbell v. Pure
Oil Co., supra, n. 41; James v. Cities Service Oil Co., supra, n. 67; Dini v. Naiditch,
supra, n. 22; Bartels v. Continental Oil Co., supra, n. 51; Walker Hauling Co. v. John-
son, 110 GaApp. 620, 139 S.E.2d 496 (1964).
69 Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 P. 358 (1899); Pin-
son v. Young, 100 Kan. 452, 164 P. 1102 (1917); Bandosz v. Daigger & Co., supra, n.
41; Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., supra, n. 34; Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., supra, n.
41; Dini v. Naiditch, supra, n. 22; Walker Hauling Co. v. Johnson, supra, n. 68; Rogers
v. Cato Oil & Grease Co., supra, n. 58.
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rial cases are a good example of what is meant by letting one go into
hidden peril." 70
The "Public Area" Rule
If there is one major consideration responsible for the courts' grow-
ing tendency to disregard legal technicalities in order to permit recovery
by firemen (and policemen) who are injured by the negligence of land-
owners and occupiers, that consideration would have to be that the cir-
cumstances surrounding the entry onto the land often are similar to those
involving the entry thereon by members of the general public. The dis-
tinction is clearly delineated at 2 Restatement of Torts 2d 226 (1965):
where it is provided:
Section 345. Persons Entering in the Exercise of a Privilege
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the liability of a possessor of
land to one who enters the land only in the exercise of a privilege,
for either a public or private purpose, and irrespective of the pos-
sessor's consent, is the same as the liability to a licensee.
(2) The liability of a possessor of land to a public officer or em-
ployee who enters the land in the performance of his public duty,
and suffers harm because of a condition of a part of the land held
open to the public, is the same as the liability to an invitee.
Such a view was held by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts in 1885 when it permitted recovery by a police officer for injuries
sustained when he stepped into an open well concealed from view by a
high curbing. The officer had come onto the property at the request of
a tenant of the defendant, for the purpose of arresting another who was
disturbing the peace. The area where he was injured was open and gave
the impression of being a common approach to one of the buildings on
the property. Said the court, "If the appearance of the premises is such
as to point out a certain open space as the mode of approach, while it
may not be the defendant's duty to take care of the whole open space as
an approach, his duty to keep safe the approach offered, whatever it is,
is as great as if it were a wrought avenue." 71 The basic reason for such
a stand on the issue is that "the owner can reasonably anticipate" that
an officer or fireman will use an existing passageway on the premises,
and the owner will therefore be liable for injuries resulting from "the
carelessness of the owner in failing to warn (the fireman) of an unsafe
passageway." 72
The rule would not apply where, for example, the porch on the side
of a building collapses while being used as a platform from which fire-
men are fighting a fire, since the porch would not have been "used as it
70 Anderson v. Cinnamon, supra, n. 8.
71 Learoyd v. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315, 324.
72 Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, supra, n. 26, 167 N.Y.S. at 743.
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was intended to be used." 73 In other words, the rule is applicable only
as to areas "ordinarily utilized for passage through the premises." 74
Yet, the factors precluding the use of the rule are factual in nature,
and do not depend on whether the jurisdiction classifies firemen as licen-
sees, sui generis or invitees.7 5
Implementation of the Rationale: Three Approaches
Having thus reviewed the rationale underlying the ability of firemen
to recover for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of land-
owners and occupiers, we may now consider the means by which the
reasoning involved is implemented to make reality as just as the theory
which purports to serve it. To be considered are three jurisdictions
whose approaches differ greatly: Ohio, Illinois and New York.
Ohio
Our own State has always had the rule that a fireman (or police-
man) on the premises in the line of duty is a licensee.76 The rule was
recently affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court,7 7 which stated the grounds
under which recovery may be had:
Reasoning and experience support the public policy that the duty
of an owner of private premises toward policemen and firemen who
come upon his premises by authority of law in the performance of
their official duties and suffer injury should be only that duty owed
to a licensee, and that the owner should only be liable where such
73 Anderson v. Cinnamon, supra, n. 8, 282 S.W.2d at 448, refusing to follow Schwab
v. Rubel Corp., supra, n. 64, and saying that Missouri law does not require a warning
to licensees regarding known dangers, short of those constituting unusual hazards.
The Anderson case further held that the possessor of land was not shown to have
known that firemen would use the porch, and his failure to warn them after they
went onto the porch was not active negligence and thus not actionable.
74 Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc. and Miller v. Roman Catholic Church
of St. Stephen, both supra, n. 15.
75 Taylor v. Palmetto Theater Co., 204 S.C. 1, 28 S.E.2d 538 (1943). In an ingeniously
worded petition, the plaintiff, a fireman injured while fighting a fire in a theater
passageway, managed to satisfy the South Carolina Supreme Court that the defend-
ant had owed him the same duties it owed the general public, since the case in-
volved a pitfall in a public passageway which could be expected to be used by all
"persons lawfully entering the premises for a public or private purpose." The court
said (at 28 S.E.2d 541), "In the circumstances alleged in the complaint, the fact that
the appellant was a fireman, and in the discharge of his duties as such, should not
limit his cause of action to the right or permission to enter the premises of respond-
ent extended by the law." (And this in a state which, to this day, classifies a fireman
as a licensee. See Baxley v. Williams Construction Co., supra, n. 6.)
76 Mason Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger, 15 Ohio App. 310, 20 Ohio L. R. 577 (1921),
aff'd on app. on procedural grounds, 108 Ohio St. 377, 140 N.E. 770 (1923); Eckert,
Admr. v. Refiners Oil Co., 17 Ohio App. 221 (1923); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dixon,
14 Ohio L. Abs. 203 (Ohio App. 7th Dist. 1932); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Sause, 14
Ohio L. Abs. 429 (Ohio App. 7th Dist. 1933), error dism'd 128 Ohio St. 49, 190 N.E.
408; James v. Cities Service Oil Co., supra, n. 67; City of Youngstown v. Cities Serv-
ice Oil Co., 66 Ohio App. 97, 31 N.E.2d 876 (1940). (All the cases involving Cities Serv-
ice Oil Co. arose out of the same incident.)
77 In Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38
(1963). See n. 2, supra.
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injury is inflicted by willful or wanton misconduct, or an active act
of negligence, or by a violation of a duty created by statute or ordi-
nance (for the benefit of policemen or firemen), or where a hidden
trap caused the injury or where the owner had knowledge of the
presence of the policeman or fireman on the premises and the oppor-
tunity to warn him of the danger and failed to do so.
78
In Ohio, there is no recovery where negligence merely stdrted the
fire and created no unforeseeable hazards. 79 However, a hidden hazard,
absent warning, will justify recovery. 0 A warning, of course, "is not
necessary where the danger is open and can be seen," "I and a fireman
who could not know of a dangerous condition cannot be said to have as-
sumed the risk thereof.8 2 Whether something constitutes a "reasonable
warning" depends on
the facts and circumstances of the case-the language used, the con-
duct, the tone of voice, the facts and circumstances surrounding the
same, the time of giving the warning, and whether or not it was sea-
sonable, so as to give the party warned an opportunity to act upon
the warning in order to save himself.
8 3
And the warning must be "such as a person of ordinary care and pru-
dence would give under like or similar circumstances." 84 Knowledge on
the part of, or warning to, the captain or other members of the fire de-
partment normally would be notice to all other members of a dangerous
condition.8 5 The duty to warn arises where there exists a condition
which could reasonably be anticipated as hazardous to firefighters, if the
danger is unknown to them and "could not be discovered with ordinary
care under the then existing circumstances." 86
78 Id., 192 N.E.2d at 43. The court in Scheurer refused to agree with the liberal rul-
ing in Dini v. Naiditch, the landmark Illinois case discussed under the heading of
Illinois, infra, and said that the State of Ohio had long held firemen and policemen to
be licensees. Yet a vigorous dissent by Judge Rankin Gibson urged the overruling
of the licensee rule in favor of an invitee classification, basing his contention on the
fact that building inspectors, revenue agents, health inspectors, sanitary inspectors,
safety inspectors, garbage collectors, city water-meter readers, United States post-
men, tax collectors, and customs collectors have all been given the rights of invitees
or classed as such.
The court also mentioned the almost identical 1917 N.Y. case of Meiers v. Fred
Koch Brewery, supra, n. 26, but ignored that case's application of the Public Area
Rule. The rule, if applied in "Scheurer, would have required a finding for plaintiff,
who fell at night into an unguarded pit in a driveway.
79 Eckert, Admr., v. Refiners Oil Co. and Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dixon, both supra,
n. 76.
80 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dixon; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Sause; James v. Cities
Service Oil Co., (all supra, n. 76); Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, supra,
n. 77.
81 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dixon, supra, n. 76.
82 Ibid.
83 Mason Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger, supra, n. 28, 140 N.E. at 771 (Ohio Sup.
Ct.).
84 Id., par. 3 of the syllabus in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 15 Ohio App. at
310.
85 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Sause and Mason Tire & Rubber Co., both supra, n. 76.
86 Mason Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lansinger (App.), supra, n. 76.
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The Ohio Supreme Court has expressly refused to permit recovery
by a policeman or fireman who suffers injury other than as provided for
in the general rule as to liability to licensees.8 7 In such case, "the owner
of the premises is not liable," and the fireman or policeman is limited to
such recovery as he may obtain under Ohio's workmen's compensation
law (Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.01), less any amount received from a mu-
nicipally-established and -maintained pension fund (§ 4123.02).88
Outside of the limiting instances, if the circumstances warrant, an
Ohio fireman will benefit from a reasonable interpretation of the facts
and obtain recovery. In a case bearing a strong resemblance to Bartels
v. Continental Oil Co., 9 the plaintiff fireman answered a call to fight a
fire on the defendant's premises which contained four gasoline storage
tanks whose existence was apparent. The tanks were in line, and the
blaze raged over and around the first in line. That tank had a two-inch
vent, considered adequate to allow gas vapors to escape. The other three
tanks, more distant from the fire, bore vents of inadequate size, less than
the two-inch size customary in the trade. The properly-vented tank
survived the ordeal, but the number 2 tank, which the fire eventually
reached, exploded, inflicting serious injuries on the plaintiff. The court
held that "it surely was a question of fact for the jury to determine
whether it was or was not the affirmative act of the defendants in re-
stricting the size of the vent on Tank No. 2 that caused the plaintiff's
injury, and which was the proximate cause thereof." 90
Ohio, then, adheres to the old-line common law restriction placing
firemen and policemen in the licensee class, but, within the limitations
imposed by that restriction, seeks to permit recovery.
87 Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, supra, n. 77. See text at n. 78 for the
rule.
88 Ibid. Gibson, J., in his dissent (supra, n. 78), argues that firemen and policemen
ought not to be limited to recovery under those sections, since "the fact that a work-
man is covered by workmen's compensation has not prevented him from maintaining
an action to recover damages for his injuries inflicted by a third-party tortfeasor." It
also should be noted that the deduction provision of 4123.02 is applicable only to the
policemen or firemen themselves, and a widow or other dependent of a deceased fire-
man or policeman is able to collect the entire Workmen's Compensation death award
in addition to anything received from a municipal pension fund. Akron v. Moore,
9 Ohio App.2d 33, ___ N.E.2d --- (1967).
89 Supra, n. 51.
90 Lamb v. Sebach, 52 Ohio App. 362, 3 N.E.2d 686 (1935). The reduction in size of
the vents reduced their effectiveness as a safety device by 97%, and created a hazard
both unnecessary and unforeseeable to the firefighters. The inadequate vents were
maintained in contravention of an order from a deputy state fire marshal to maintain
all vents at the 2-inch size. Defendants' purpose in violating the order was "to pre-
vent wastage of gasoline." In addition, when the firemen arrived, the defendants as-
sured them there was "no danger." It is questionable whether, with less explicit evi-
dence of the defendants' malfeasance, the plaintiff could have recovered. Nowhere
does the Ohio court use the "increased hazard" reasoning which was the basis of the
decision in the Bartels case.
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Illinois: Dini v. Naiditch
In 1892, the Supreme Court of Illinois classified firemen as licensees.
The case9' before the court dealt with a fireman who worked for a fire
insurance patrol company who responded to a fire alarm on the defend-
ant's property. While descending with five of his fellow firemen in an
elevator which was the only means of access to the basement, he sus-
tained injuries to his leg when the rope holding the counterweight broke,
and the falling weight drove his leg through the floor. The Court said
that the landowner had been "under no obligation to (plaintiff) to either
keep his building and premises in a safe condition or construct and
maintain his hoist or elevator in such manner as that it could be safely
used," and upheld the trial court's directed verdict for the defendant.
The court reasoned, "(H)ere there was not even a license from appellee;
the only license was from the law. And so he (plaintiff) had no right to
conclude that there was an assurance from (the landowner) that either
the premises or the elevator were safe." 92 The licensee classification
thereafter was the law in Illinois,93 until 1960. In that year, the case of
Dini v. Naiditch94 rejected the licensee classification and overruled Gib-
son v. Leonard and the cases which had relied on it. The court said: 95
(W) e note that this legal fiction that firemen are licensees to whom
no duty of reasonable care is owed is without any logical foundation.
... It is highly illogical to say that a fireman who enters the prem-
ises quite independently of either invitation or consent cannot be an
invitee because there has been no invitation, but can be a licensee
even though there has been no permission. The lack of logic is even
more patent when we realize that the courts have not applied the
term "licensee" to other types of public employees required to come
on another's premises in the performance of their duties, and to
whom the duty of reasonable care is owed. If benefit to the land-
owner is the decisive factor, it is difficult to perceive why a fireman
is not entitled to that duty of care, or how the landowner derives a
greater benefit from the visit of other public officials, such as post-
men, water meter readers and revenue inspectors, than from the
fireman who comes to prevent the destruction of his property.
Consequently, it is our opinion that since the common-law rule
labelling firemen is but an illogical anachronism, originating in a
vastly different social order, and pock-marked by judicial refine-
ments, it should not be perpetuated in the name of "stare decisis."
91 Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182.
92 Id., 32 N.E. at 184.
93 See Eckels v. Maher, 137 Ill.App. 45 (1907); Casey v. Adams, 234 Ill. 350, 84 N.E.
933 (1908); Thrift v. Vandalia R.R. Co., 145 Ill.App. 414 (1908); Volluz v. East St.
Louis Light & Power Co., 210 Ill.App. 565 (1918). Yet recovery could be had had
there been active negligence, as where a land occupier handled and stored benzol in
a manner which was in violation of statute and ordinance, resulting not only in the
first explosion, which caused the fire, but a second, which fatally injured the fireman.
Bandosz v. Daigger & Co., 255 Ill.App. 494 (1930).
94 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
95 Id., 170 N.E.2d at 885-6.
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* . . Stare decisis ought not to be the excuse for decision where rea-
son is lacking.
The court then agreed with the Meiers case, supra, and held that "an
action should lie against a landowner for failure to exercise reasonable
care in the maintenance of his property resulting in the injury or death
of a fireman rightfully on the premises, fighting the fire at a place where
he might reasonably be expected to be." 96
Thus, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in one swift motion, exemplified
the use of reason to discard stare decisis in favor of justice. While the
Court did not explicitly declare firemen to be invitees, it did, in effect,
extend to them the rights of invitees where their injuries could have
been anticipated by the negligent landowner.
New York
Reform has not been limited to the common law. If there is one
place in our nation where our underpaid and, often, unappreciated fire-
fighters have received both judicial and legislative acknowledgment of
their contribution to society, that place is New York.
Firemen in New York have not always found it possible to recover
for injuries sustained as a result of a landowner's negligence. In 1904,
a fireman, while fighting a fire on the defendant's premises, was crushed
under an elevator which fell through a hatchway left open in violation
of an ordinance. A statute permitted recovery (for violations of such
safety statutes) by the board of fire commissioners, but made no pro-
vision for recovery by firemen themselves. The appellate court ruled
that there was no ground for recovery outside the statute, and that the
statute itself was limited to the board of commissioners9 7 Yet relief was
not long in coming. Seven years later, a case arose wherein a policeman,
checking a partly-open door in defendant's building at night, stepped
through the door and died when he fell down an unguarded elevator
shaft. As in the Eckes case, the open shaft constituted violation of an
ordinance, which required that elevator shafts be guarded by closed
guards or gates and by adequate trapdoors. The court held that the
officer's next of kin could use the ordinance violation to show negli-
gence. 98
96 Id. at 886.
97 Eckes v. Stetler, 98 App.Div. 76, 90 N.Y.S. 473, 476-7 (1904).
98 Racine v. Morris, 136 App.Div. 467, 121 N.Y.S. 146, aff'd, 201 N.Y. 240, 94 N.E. 864
(1911). See also excerpt from opinion in text. It is noteworthy that the decision of
the Appellate Division was rendered at a time when it was held that policemen and
firemen "on private premises in the performance of duty . . .are both licensees by
operation of law," and that therefore "this action by the next of kin of officer cannot
be sustained upon the principles of the common law," but "it can be sustained upon
(Continued on next page)
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In 1920, New York was finally confronted with its landmark case,
Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery,99 a case in which there was no statute on
which to rely. The plaintiff, fire chief of a small town, had answered an
alarm of fire on the defendant's property. He proceeded on foot down
a driveway intended for public usage in the ordinary course of defend-
ant's business, and fell in the darkness into an unguarded open coal pit
situated at the driveway's end. The Appellate Division allowed recovery
for injuries thereby sustained, holding that the owner reasonably could
have anticipated the use of the public driveway by the plaintiff, and
owed the plaintiff the duty to warn him of the unsafe passageway. The
Court of Appeals dismissed defendant's contention that plaintiff was not
there to confer any benefit to defendant, and therefore had to be limited
to the status of a licensee.'0 0 The court further used an "assumption of
risk" line of reasoning to invalidate the defense that no consent had been
given to the fireman to enter.1 1
The Meiers case, significant though it was, nonetheless was limited
to an injury involving a public passageway the use of which could have
been anticipated, and arising out of a hazard utterly unconnected with
the fire itself. In Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp.,'1 2 the New York Court
of Appeals dealt with an action for the wrongful death of a fireman killed
by an explosion of "paints, lacquers, benzine, gasoline, turpentine, alco-
hol, and other highly volatile and explosive liquids," all of which had
been stored on the defendant's premises in violation of municipal ordi-
nances. The court held that the defendant had fastened liability upon
himself by his failure to observe the ordinances, which "were enacted
for the benefit of firemen as well as guests in the hotels; at least firemen
entering into the premises had a right to assume that the law in this par-
ticular had been complied with." 103
(Continued from preceding page)
the theory that . . . the enactment of the Building Code . . . has added to the duties
which the defendant owed to the decedent at common law a further duty which they
(sic) violated and upon which negligence may be predicated." (121 N.Y.S. at 150).
Thus, the court used a legislative enactment (a municipal ordinance which was rati-
fied by the state legislature, and thus had the import of a state statute) in order to
circumvent an outmoded rule of the common law.
99 180 App. Div. 450, 167 N.Y.S. 740, aff'd, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
100 Id., 127 N.E. at 492. "(The plaintiff fireman) was, it is true, engaged in a public
service. Incidentally, however, this service requires him to protect the owner's prop-
erty. The interests of the latter as an individual are involved quite apart from his
interests as one of the public. The fireman's purpose 'is connected with the business
in which the occupant is engaged,' although he also has higher and greater ends to
serve...
101 Ibid. See also excerpt from the opinion, supra, text at n. 13.
102 274 N.Y. 106, 8 N.E.2d 296 (1937).
103 Citing, as authority, Racine v. Morris, supra, n. 98, and Carlock v. Westchester
Lighting Co., 268 N.Y. 345, 197 N.E. 306 (1935), which permitted recovery for the
death of a fireman electrocuted when, while inspecting premises of a third party, he
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The "duty to warn" was discussed in Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St.
Corp. A large quantity of gasoline from adjoining property had seeped
into a basement room in defendant's building. When a fire broke out in
that room, plaintiff was among those who responded. He and several
other firemen were descending the stairs into the room when the gasoline
exploded. An agent of the defendant landowner had been present when
the fire broke out and was aware of the danger of explosion, but he failed
to warn the firemen although he knew of their arrival. The Court of Ap-
peals conceded that "the presence of gasoline in the quantity indicated
would not, under ordinary circumstances, constitute an unusual hazard,"
but said that the gasoline's "presence in a closed room in which a fire
was burning and where an explosion had occurred [prior to the firemen's
arrival] presented a situation on which the jury might predicate a find-
ing of unusual hazard. If such a danger existed, to the knowledge of the
defendant or its agent, the defendant was under a duty if it had oppor-
tunity to give warning of the peril." 104
The Jenkins case, in applying the "unusual hazard rule," first used
in Meiers, to dangers connected with the fire itself, gave the New York
courts a precedent that they were not to ignore. A case arose wherein a
fireman fell through a floor opening which was concealed from his view
only by the smoke generated by the fire. The Court of Appeals held that
the trial court should have given to the jury the questions of 1) whether
there was an unusual hazard, 2) whether the defendants knew or should
have known of it, and 3) whether defendants had given plaintiff "a
proper and definite warning of the peril." 105
New York, thus, was attempting to qualify its rule as to unusual
hazards by stressing the need for the consideration of factual context in
determining whether an unusual hazard existed at a fire. In a 1954 case
in which a fireman sued for injuries sustained when a stored automo-
bile's gas tank exploded during a fire at the defendant's gas station, the
court held that there was no unusual hazard and thus no duty on the
part of the defendant to warn the plaintiff.106 The court felt that, since
104 284 N.Y. 397, 31 N.E.2d 503, 504 (1940).
105 Schwab v. Rubel Corp., 286 N.Y. 525, 37 N.E.2d 234, 236 (1941) wherein the court
stated:
Clearly it was a question of fact whether there was here presented a situation
constituting an unusual hazard, within the meaning of the Jenkins case, to one
privileged to enter the building for a public purpose. (Citing Restatement of the
Law of Torts, Section 345). A jury could have found that the condition existed
to the knowledge, and resultant responsibility, of the defendants in view of testi-
mony as to continued presence on the premises (of employees of defendants).
(I)t was not necessary for the warning to be given to each and every officer or
fireman who entered the room. Warning to the first to enter would have been
sufficient.
106 Gannon v. Royal Properties, 285 App.Div. 131, 136 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131, aff'd. 309
(Continued on next page)
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it is common knowledge that all garages have gasoline stored on the
premises, the firemen should have taken such special actions and pre-
cautions as the known presence of the gasoline warranted.
The most explicit enunciation of the rights of firemen as against
negligent owners and occupiers of land was made in 1957, in Beeden-
bender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., a case involving a suit by a police-
man. 0 7 The court said:
Policemen and firemen do not readily fit the categories either of
licensee or invitee. Both licensee and invitee enter upon the prem-
ises with the consent of the owner-one is tolerated, the other solic-
ited. In the case of policemen and firemen, consent is irrelevant. It
makes no difference if their entrance is permitted or invited since,
if the conditions calling for their entry exist, they enter the prem-
ises as of right. The landowner is not free to give or withhold his
consent, as he may with invitees and licensees, nor are the policemen
and firemen free to enter or refrain from entering, as they may
choose. They act neither by permission nor by invitation. They act
by command. (citing Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, supra, note 99.)
Hence, policemen and firemen must be treated neither as in-
vitees nor as licensees but as a special class, sui generis, privileged
to enter the land for a public purpose irrespective of consent.
Whether they have entered to rout a prowler or to fight a fire on the
same or on the adjacent premises,'0 8 whether they have been sum-
moned by the owner or enter of their own volition, the duties owed
them do not vary. The duties are twofold. First, the owner is obliged
to use reasonable care to keep in safe condition those parts of the
premises which are utilized as the ordinary means of access for all
persons entering thereon (citing Meiers case). Second, if the owner
knows of the presence on the premises of officially privileged per-
sons, such as firemen or policemen, is cognizant of a dangerous con-
dition thereon, and has reason to believe that they are unaware of
the danger, he has a duty to warn them of the condition and of the
risk involved. (citing Jenkins case, supra, note 104 and Schwab v.
(Continued from preceding page)
N.Y. 819, 130 N.E.2d 616 (1955). But there is no reason to doubt that New York
would have allowed recovery had conditions at the defendant's gas station contained
factors which increased the hazard to a level beyond that which a fireman would
reasonably expect to find at a gasoline station. See the cases of Bartels v. Conti-
nental Oil Co., (Mo. 1964, supra, n. 51) and Lamb v. Sebach (Ohio 1935, supra, n. 90).
107 4 App. Div. 2d 276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276, aff'd without opinion, 5 App. Div. 2d 980,
173 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1958). The plaintiff had been searching at night for a prowler in
a certain building, and, in walking toward the back thereof, came upon a wall block-
ing the alley. The wall, erected by the owner of adjacent property, blocked the
egress of persons who would have used the fire escape of the first building. An ordi-
nance required a landowner to provide clear egress away from a fire escape to the
street. Citing the ordinance as evidence of the joint negligence of both landowners,
whom he joined as defendants, the plaintiff sought to recover for injuries he sus-
tained when he attempted to scale the wall. The court ruled that the statute did not
require a landowner to provide egress for those using a fire escape on adjacent
premises of another.
108 It is interesting that the court was, at the same time, relieving the adjacent prop-
erty owner involved in this case of his duty to the policeman in this instance. The
distinction, of course, is in that the case was dealing with a statutory duty, while the
court at this point was discussing a common-law duty, the former being restricted
by the language of the statute involved.
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Rubel Corp., supra, note 105). The owner owes no duty to those
privileged to enter irrespective of consent to safeguard those parts
of his property not ordinarily utilized for passage through the prem-
ises, or to discover potential dangers therein, for the entry thereon
by such persons under unusual conditions at any hour of the day or
night is not reasonably foreseeable. (Defendants') back yard fence
was not the ordinary exit or entrance from their premises. Hence
there cannot be spelled out any common-law duty on the part of the
appellants (landowners) to maintain that fence, and the door in it,
at all times as a safe passageway so that in an emergency plaintiff
could pass readily from one back yard to another.
Any duty of appellants must rest upon the obligation to warn.
It cannot be said, however, that the duty to warn existed as a matter
of law. The very existence of that duty was a question of fact for
the determination of the jury. Before it could be found that such a
d4ity existed, the jury would first have to find that the (circum-
stances) presented an unusual hazard; that (defendant) . . . knew of
the hazard; and that he had reason to believe that plaintiff... would
not discover the danger for himself.
Even if the jury were to find that warning should have been
given, and that it was not, there would still remain for its determi-
nation, among other things, the question of whether the failure to
give warning was in fact the proximate cause of the accident.10 9
(Emphasis added.)
Not content with allowing the right of a fireman to recover from a
negligent owner or occupier of land to be determined by the courts
alone, the City of New York enacted an ordinance'1 ° which provides for
recovery by a fireman for injuries which he has received while fighting
a fire, where such injuries are, directly or indirectly, the result of the
violation of any legislative or administrative safety regulation imposed
by any level of government, from federal down to municipal, and such
recovery is to be had "in addition to any other right of action or recovery
under any other provision of law." When this ordinance is used as the
basis for suit by a fireman, suit may be brought after the expiration of
the statute of limitations for suits brought otherwise than under this
ordinance.' Moreover, recovery thereunder may be had even though
the violation resulted merely in the starting of the fire, rather than in the
creation of a dangerous condition which confronted the fireman after his
109 The Beedenbender sui generis reasoning was followed by Larson v. First Natl.
Bank of Mt. Vernon, 37 Misc.2d 678, 236 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup.Ct. 1962), which involved
a policeman who, while checking for a prowler behind the defendant's bank, walked
across the lawn, slipped on a pile of rock and debris, and fell. The court, in holding
for the defendant, distinguished the facts from the Meiers case in that the bank lawn
did not constitute an ordinary means of access to the premises. See also Miller v.
Roman Catholic Church of St. Stephen, 24 App. Div. 2d 603, 262 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1965).
110 Sec. 205-a, General Municipal Law.
111 Sicolo v. Prudential Savings Bank, 2 Misc.2d 289, 151 N.Y.S.2d 295, aff'd 4 App.
Div.2d 790, 165 N.Y.S.2d 222, rev'd on other grounds 5 N.Y.2d 254, 184 N.Y.S.2d 100,
157 N.E.2d 284 (1959).
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arrival.1 1 2 When the suit is brought under the ordinance, the defendant
cannot avail himself of the usual defenses of assumption of risk or con-
tributory negligence.
1 3
A Proposal for a Reasonable Solution
It would appear that two conclusions can reasonably be drawn from
the experience of the courts and society in their attempts to seek justice
for fire and police officials:
1) The courts, try as they may to be just, are still entangled in a web
of stare decisis and antiquated technicalities which delay, and
often deny, justice; and
2) That which may take courts decades to accomplish through the
common law, which is so very slow to change, may be achieved
overnight by legislative bodies, whether state or municipal.
In the hope that reasonable rules of law will one day be universally
available for the advantage of our dedicated and underpaid public serv-
ants, to whom serious injuries can mean a lifetime of suffering without
adequate compensation, this writer respectfully suggests to the legisla-
tures of our several states the following statute, based on common-law
reasoning, which is presently being studied by the Ohio General Assem-
bly after having been introduced as House Bill 426 by the Hon. Frank J.
Gorman, State Representative from the 55th District.
(A) Whenever a policeman or fireman who, in the course of his
duties, is on privately-owned premises, suffers injury or death
proximately caused, in whole or in part, by:
1) Negligent construction or maintenance of any part of the realty
which is ordinarily used by the general public, or by the own-
ers or occupiers of the realty or by their agents, employees or
servants, either as a means of access to and from the property,
or both, or which may reasonably be anticipated by the owner
or occupier as a route to be traversed by any of the above-
named classes of individuals; or by
2) The creation or maintenance, or both, of any condition the
existence of which could not reasonably have been foreseen by
the policeman or fireman, but whose existence could reason-
ably have been foreseen by the said owner or occupier as haz-
ardous to any policeman or fireman on the premises in the line
of duty; or by
112 Carroll v. Pellicio Bros., Inc., 44 Misc.2d 832, 255 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup.Ct. 1964).
113 Ibid. and Nykanen v. City of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 697, 250 N.Y.S.2d 53, 199 N.E.2d
155 (1964).
Cf. Daggett v. Keshner, 284 App. Div. 733, 134 N.Y.S.2d 524, 529 (1954), involving
a recovery by a policeman under Sec. C19-153.0 of the Administrative Code of the
City of New York for injuries sustained as a result of a fire set by arsonists, to whom
defendant, in violation of above regulation, had sold gasoline. (Ordinance expressly
provided for recovery for personal injuries resulting from such wrongful sale.) The
court said that proximate causation between the violation and the injury need not
be established, but some causal relation between the two must exist.
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3) The violation of any statute, ordinance, or administrative regu-
lation intended to safeguard human life or limb, regardless of
whether such statute, ordinance or regulation is intended for
the protection of the general public or of any specified class,
and if the latter, regardless of whether such class includes po-
licemen or firemen, and regardless of whether any branch of
government has issued citations, notices, or warnings for viola-
tions thereof prior to the time of the injury or death in ques-
tion;
and where, in addition, neither the said owner or occupier nor his
or their agents, employees or servants has given to said fireman or
policeman such notice, either actual or constructive, as would ap-
prise him of both the nature and extent of the condition, prior to
his coming onto the premises or near enough thereto to be injured
as a result of the said condition or violation, and where the con-
dition or violation is not otherwise known to the policeman or fire-
man,
THEN, such policeman or fireman, or his representative, shall have
a cause of action against the owner or occupier, or other parties, or
against any combination thereof, as provided in provision (D) of this
section, for the injury or death so sustained.
(B) Fire prevention statutes, ordinances and regulations shall be
considered within the purview of (A) (3).
(C) Under no circumstances shall the policeman or fireman be con-
sidered guilty of contributory negligence merely because of his
willingness to assume the ordinary and foreseeable hazards of
his occupation.
(D) Where it cannot be determined whether the control of the
premises in regard to the condition involved was in the owner
or the occupier, or where such control was joint and concur-
rent, then both the owner and occupier shall be jointly and
severally liable under this statute; but where such control was
clearly that of one party to the exclusion of the other, then
solely the party in control shall be liable. And where the act
or omission of a party not either owner or occupier has con-
tributed to any condition or violation under (A) of this section,
then such party shall be jointly and severally liable along with
all other liable parties.
(E) A cause of action authorized by this statute shall exist inde-
pendent of, and without reference to, any payments or recov-
eries to which such policeman or fireman may be entitled by
Workmen's Compensation laws or by any pension funds, or
both, and the amount of recovery in such cause of action shall
be unaffected thereby. No mention of any such payments or
recoveries shall be permitted by the court in any action arising
under this section.
(F) This statute shall not negate or diminish any rights which po-
licemen or firemen have under the common law of this state,
with regard to injuries or death occurring prior to the effective
date hereof.
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